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State v. Thomas: When Is a Confession Coerced and
When Is It Voluntary?
The United States Constitution provides a criminal defendant with the right
to due process of law,1 the right to assistance of counsel, 2 and the privilege
against self-incrimination. 3 American courts have used all three of these consti-
tutional provisions to refuse to admit into evidence certain confessions made by
criminal defendants.4 No matter which premise is used to determine whether
confessions are admissible, the underlying theme is the same: confessions ex-
tracted by unacceptable means will not be used as substantive evidence against a
defendant.5 There are, however, varying interpretations concerning what are
unacceptable means. Some methods of extracting a confession have been found
to be clearly unacceptable. 6 Many questionable methods, however, have been
found acceptable. 7
In State v. Thomas8 the North Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the ad-
missibility of a defendant's confession in light of two rules of evidence. 9 One
rule arose from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Edwards v. Ari-
zona10 that once an accused invokes his fifth amendment right to counsel, there
can be no further police interrogation unless the accused initiates the dialogue. 1
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 15.01 (1980); J. COOK, CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED § 70 (1974).
5. Although not admitted for substantive purposes, in "some circumstances an improperly
obtained confession may be used for impeachment purposes." J. COOK, supra note 4, § 70. Also, in
Milton v. Wainwright, 407 U.S. 371 (1972), the United States Supreme Court upheld the admission
into evidence of a confession that arguably resulted from the violation of the defendant's fifth and
sixth amendment rights because the admission was shown beyond a reasonable doubt to be harmless
error. Id. at 372-73. Commenting on the harmless error doctrine, Professor Whitebread observed:
"If the primary reason for Miranda is to deter coercive methods by the police, then the harmless
error doctrine should seldom, if ever, be applicable." C. WHITEBREAD, supra note 4, § 15.06, at 322.
6. See, eg., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (confession obtained during police custo.
dial interrogation from a suspect who was not warned of his fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (confession obtained through long-term
interrogation of defendant who was deprived of sleep); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)
(confession obtained through the use of physical brutality).
7. See, eg., Leuschen v. State, 41 Md. App. 423, 397 A.2d 622, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 933(1979) (inculpatory statements made by defendant to an undercover officer during the course of
general conversation in defendant's cell were not obtained in violation of defendant's Miranda
rights); State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 687-89, 304 S.E.2d 579, 583-84 (1983) (defendant's sixth
amendment right to counsel had not yet arisen while he was in custody on an unrelated charge but
before a warrant for his arrest concerning the crime at issue had been executed); State v. Pacheco,
481 A.2d 1009, 1022-27 (R.I. 1984) (police officer's promise to help defendant receive sentence to be
served at an out-of-state prison and to dismiss charges against defendant's companion did not make
defendant's confession involuntary).
8. 310 N.C. 369, 312 S.E.2d 458 (1984).
9. Id. at 377-79, 312 S.E.2d at 462-64.
10. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
11. Id. at 484-85. The Court in Edwards noted that Miranda "declared that an accused has a
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation." Id.
at 482. For a discussion of the Edwards holding, see infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
EVIDENCE
The other rule is a North Carolina requirement that a confession be voluntary to
be admissible. 12 This Note discusses the background of both rules and the rea-
soning used by the court in applying them. This Note also analyzes the ambigui-
ties inherent in both rules but unaddressed by the court. It concludes that
although the Thomas decision is not a pronounced deviation from existing case
law involving either rule, 13 there are problems with the court's straightforward
approach, including the possibility that use of coercive confessions will be less
restricted in the future.
At approximately 5:30 a.m. on May 26, 1982, a ten year old boy was sexu-
ally assaulted while on his newspaper route in Winston-Salem. t4 The victim
described his assailant as a jogger.1 5 On August 6, 1982, the victim identified
the defendant as his assailant from a group of six photographs.' 6 Defendant had
been arrested on August 5, 1982, for a different assault, which occurred on Au-
gust 4, 1982.17 At the time of his arrest defendant was informed of his Miranda
rights,' 8 and he apparently understood them. 19 The next day, defendant was
taken by two police officers from jail to the city hall, where he was again in-
formed of his rights, both orally and in writing.20 After defendant waived his
rights,2 ' the two officers began to question him "in very general terms."'22 When
they began to question him specifically about the assault of May 26, "defendant
indicated that he did not want to talk further and that he wanted an attorney."'23
The officers then stopped questioning defendant and took him to the Office of
the Clerk of Superior Court, where one of the officers filled out an arrest
warrant.
24
While filling out the arrest warrant, one of the officers said to defendant:
"Be sure to tell your attorney that you had the opportunity to help yourself and
didn't."'25 Approximately five minutes after the officer made the comment, de-
fendant asked the officer if he still wanted a statement. The officer responded
that it was up to defendant.2 6 Defendant was again taken to the city hall and
informed of his rights. Defendant then waived his rights and gave an incrimi-
12. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 378-79, 312 S.E.2d at 463-64. For a discussion of North Carolina's
voluntariness rule, see infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
13. See infra text following note 74.
14. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 370, 312 S.E.2d at 459.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
18. For a discussion of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), see infra notes
38-40 and accompanying text.
19. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
20. Id. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
21. Brief for Appellant at 72 app., Thomas.
22. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. During the voir dire hearing, see infra note 28, defendant gave his version of what took
place after he asked for an attorney:
I'm not sure if Mr. Weavil [one of the police officers) got up and left the room or not, but
Mr. Dalton [the second police officer] was there, and he was very polite and asked what
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nating statement to the officers. 27
At trial the court conducted a voir dire hearing to determine the admissibil-
ity of defendant's confession.28 Finding that the confession was not the result of
any questioning or inducement by the officers and that the confession "was made
freely, voluntarily, and understandingly,"' 29 the trial court admitted the confes-
sion into evidence over defendant's objection. The jury found Thomas guilty
and sentenced him to life imprisonment. 30
Thomas came before the North Carolina Supreme Court on an appeal of
right.31 Defendant assigned as error the admission of his confession, basing his
argument on two grounds. First, he claimed that the confession was obtained in
violation of the Edwards rule because the officer's suggestion that defendant tell
his attorney he had been given an opportunity to help himself was interrogation
initiated by the officer after defendant had invoked his right to counsel. 32 Sec-
ond, defendant claimed that his confession was involuntary because it was "in-
duced by the suggestion of hope or fear implanted in his mind" by the officer's
comment.
33
The North Carolina Supreme Court's rejection of defendant's claims was
brief. First, the court held that the officer's comment was not interrogation and
therefore did not violate the Edwards rule. 34 Second, the court held that the
confession was not the product of coercion or fear and therefore was made by
religion I was. Said, "You're a reasonable person." And I said I was raised as a Southern
Baptist, and he said good morals, that sort of thing.
"You're a smart person. If you had a chance to help yourself, wouldn't you?" And I
said, "Yes, I would." And he said, "Well, a statement would help you very much." And I
said, "I have nothing further to say."
And then he sat up in his chair and shuffled his papers and he said, "Well, when you
do speak to your lawyer, tell him you had a chance to help yourself and you didn't."
Brief for Appellant at 61 app., Thomas.
27. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
28. Id. When a defendant objects to the admission of his confession into evidence, "the trial
judge should then excuse the jury and in the absence of the jury hear the evidence of both State and
the defendant upon the question of whether defendant, if he made an admission or confession, volun-
tarily and understandingly made the admission or confession." State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 291,
158 S.E.2d 511, 516 (1968).
29. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
30. Id. at 370, 312 S.E.2d at 459.
31. The appeal as a matter of right was in accordance with N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27 (1981).
32. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 462-63. For a discussion of the holding in Ed-
wards, see infra text accompanying notes 53-59.
33. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 463. Defendant assigned two other points as error.
First, defendant contended that the trial court had admitted evidence which tended to show that
defendant had committed a separate offense. The trial court had admitted the evidence on the
ground that defendant had put his identity and presence at the crime scene in issue. The court,
therefore, permitted the State to present evidence of a second crime by defendant which involved
facts sufficiently unusual that they indicated the commission of both crimes by the same person. The
North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the admission of this evidence. Id. at 371-74, 312 S.E.2d at
459-61.
Second, defendant assigned as error the trial court's denial of defense counsel's motion to with-
draw himself from the case because of a potential conflict of interest. The supreme court stated that
motions to withdraw generally are left to the trial judge's discretion unless an abuse of discretion is
demonstrated. The court found no showing of abuse and therefore upheld the trial court's ruling on
the withdrawal motion. Id. at 375, 312 S.E.2d at 461.
34. Id. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
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defendant voluntarily. 35 Judge Exum dissented from the affirmance of the trial
court's decision, considering the officer's remark to be an interrogation and be-
lieving the confession to be involuntary because it was the product of a promise
of leniency. 36
To thoroughly reanalyze defendant's claims, it is necessary to consider the
development of the two admissibility rules from which the claims arose. The
Edwards rule grew out of Miranda v. Arizona.37 The United States Supreme
Court in Miranda held that certain threshold procedures were necessary to pro-
tect a criminal defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.38 The Court held that a person subjected to custodial interrogation must
be warned in "clear and unequivocal terms" that he has the right to remain
silent; that anything he says may be used against him; that he has the right to
speak with an attorney; and that he has the right to have an attorney appointed
for him if he is indigent.39 Although noting that a defendant could waive these
rights, the Court put a heavy burden on the government to show that any waiver
was made knowingly and intelligently.4° Following Miranda, the United States
Supreme Court decided three fifth amendment cases relevant to the issues in
Thomas:41 Edwards,4 2 Rhode Island v. Innis,4 3 and Oregon v. Bradshaw.44
In the first case in the trilogy, Innis, defendant had been arrested for mur-
der and was being transported in a police wagon by two police officers.4 5 With
the defendant listening, the two officers engaged in conversation concerning the
location of the gun used in the murder. They expressed great concern over the
possibility that the gun might fall into the hands of one of the retarded children
35. Id. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464.
36. Id. at 381-84, 312 S.E.2d at 465-66 (Exum, J., dissenting).
37. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Edwards was based on the statement in Miranda that "the assertion of
the right to counsel was a significant event and that once exercised by the accused, 'the interrogation
must cease until an attorney is present.'" Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at
474).
38. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-79.
39. Id. The Court in Miranda stated that it intended to give "concrete constitutional guidelines
for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow," id. at 441-42, guidelines aimed at ensuring that
an accused was given his fifth amendment privilege. Id. The Court was concerned with suspects'
compulsion to confess during custodial interrogation, even when, "in traditional terms," the sus-
pects' statements were made voluntarily. Id. at 457. The Court created procedural."safeguards"
which must be observed unless the states devise "other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exer-
cise" that right. Id. at 467.
40. Id. at 479.
41. Although the court in Thomas stated that there was "no violation of defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel," Thomas, 310 N.C. at 377, 312 S.E.2d at 463, defendant's assignment
of error and the court's analysis were based on the Edwards rule, which protects the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, the part of this Note concerning the interrogation
issue is a fifth amendment discussion. The United States Supreme Court noted that "[tihe definitions
of 'interrogation' under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term 'interrogation' is even
apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underly-
ing the two constitutional protections are quite distinct." Innis, 446 U.S. at 300 n.4.
42. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
43. 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
44. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
45. Innis, 446 U.S. at 293-94.
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who attended a nearby school.4 6 The conversation was between the two officers
only and did not include defendant. However, defendant spoke up from the
back seat and told the officers that he wanted to retrieve the gun because of the
children around the school, thereby incriminating himself.47
Defendant in Innis had been informed of his Miranda rights and had in-
voked his right to counsel before the officers' conversation about the gun took
place.48 The defendant was clearly in custody at the time he made the inculpa-
tory statement;4 9 therefore, the only question for the Court to decide under the
Miranda standard was whether the officers' conversation was "interrogation." '50
Squarely addressing what constitutes interrogation, the Court stated:
[Tihe Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in cus-
tody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional
equivalent. ... [T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not
only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the
part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this def-
inition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect rather
than the intent of the police. . . . [T]he Miranda safeguards were
designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protec-
tion against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof
of the underlying intent of the police.51
The Supreme Court applied this definition to the officers' front seat conversation
and found that the conversation was not interrogation. 52
A year after Innis, the Court decided Edwards. In Edwards defendant, ar-
rested for robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder, was informed of his Mi-
randa rights.53 He invoked his right to counsel, interrogation ceased, and he
was jailed.5 4 The next morning he was told that he had to talk with two detec-
tives, although he had not yet seen an attorney. The conversation with the
detectives resulted in his confession. 55 The Supreme Court held that "when an
accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interroga-
tion, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been
advised of his rights."5 6 The Court further held that when an accused has "ex-
pressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, [he] is not subject
46. Id. at 294-95.
47. Id. at 295.
48. Id. at 294.
49. Id. at 298. The Court in Miranda established that "custody," for Miranda purposes means
that the defendant is either "in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445.
50. Innis, 446 U.S. at 298.
51. Id. at 300-01.
52. Id. at 303.
53. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 478.
54. Id. at 479.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 484.
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to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges,
or conversations with the police."'57 The police had interrogated defendant after
he invoked his right to counsel and defendant had not initiated the exchange.
58
Therefore, his confession was inadmissible.5 9
Edwards established an apparent per se rule which would operate to ex-
clude a confession upon a showing that a defendant did not initiate the dialogue
that resulted in the confession. 6° Edwards' impact was somewhat lessened,
however, by the subsequent decision of the Court in Oregon v. Bradshaw.
61 Just
as the Court defined "interrogation" in Innis, the court in Bradshaw refined
Edwards' reference to "initiation" of communication with the police by an ac-
cused.62 In Bradshaw defendant was arrested for furnishing liquor to a minor
and was informed of his Miranda rights. When he requested an attorney, inter-
rogation ended and he was transported from the police station to jail.63 During
the trip, Bradshaw asked a police officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me
now?" 64 The subsequent discussion eventuated in defendant's confession.
65
The Court held that defendant's question "evinced a willingness and a desire for
a generalized discussion about the investigation" and that "[i]t could reasonably
have been interpreted by the officer as relating generally to the investigation."
66
Therefore, defendant's question satisfied the Edwards' "initiation"
requirement. 67
57. Id. at 484-85. The Court addressed how it would define defendant-initiated dialogue in
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044-45 (1983). See infra notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
58. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 487.
59. Id.
60. Lower courts have interpreted Edwards in two different ways. One interpretation views
Edwards as presenting the initiation requirement as just one factor to be considered in a totality of
the circumstances test. The other view of Edwards is that it mandates a two-step process in which it
is first determined whether defendant initiated the dialogue; then, if defendant did initiate it, a total-
ity of circumstances test is used to determine whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights. This latter view is really a per se rule because of the requirement that defendant initiate
the dialogue before there is waiver. Comment, Oregon v. Bradshaw: Right to Counsel Under Mi-
randa-The Waiver Standard, 19 Naw ENG. L. REV. 513, 519-20 (1984). Oregon v. Bradshaw
made it clear that the latter view is what the Edwards Court intended. See Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at
1044-45.
61. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983).
62. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045-46. For a discussion of the reference to initiation in Edwards,
see supra text accompanying note 57.
63. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1041-42.
64. Id. at 1042.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1045-46.
67. Id. The Court explained its holding:
While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a superstructure of legal refinements
around the word "initiate" in this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare
inquiry by either defendant or by a police officer should not be held to "initiate" any con-
versation or dialogue. There are some inquiries, such as a request for a drink of water or a
request to use a telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to represent a
desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly
or indirectly to the investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or a
police officer, relating to routine incidents of the custodial relationship, will not generally
"initiate" a conversation in the sense in which that word was used in Edwards.
Id. at 1045.
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North Carolina, following the United States Supreme Court, adopted the
Edwards rule. 68 The definition of interrogation in Innis and of defendant-initi-
ated dialogue in Bradshaw combine with the basic rule of Edwards-that once a
defendant requests counsel, interrogation by the police must cease unless the
defendant initiates dialogue with the police-to form the framework of analysis
for defendant's Edwards claim in Thomas.
Defendant's claim that his confession was inadmissible because it was invol-
untary has different origins. North Carolina's voluntariness standard has its ori-
gin in the belief that confessions induced by hope or fear are generally
unreliable. 69 Originally, the United States Supreme Court also used a voluntari-
ness standard, but the basis for its use was the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.70 As federal confession law developed, the due process
voluntariness test was superseded by modem confession law's emphasis on Mi-
randa.71 North Carolina's confession law, while recognizing the Miranda re-
quirements, still incorporates the test of voluntariness.72 The North Carolina
Supreme Court recently stated that in testing the voluntariness of a confession,
"the court looks at the totality of the circumstances of the case." 73 Whenever a
confession is the product of a threat or a promise of leniency, the confession is
considered involuntary and inadmissible. 74
A survey of the background of both the Edwards and the voluntariness
claims asserted by defendant in Thomas reveals that the North Carolina
Supreme Court's decision on both claims is consistent with prior law. The
troublesome aspect of Thomas is that the Edwards rule and the voluntariness
test are both surrounded by ambiguity in their application-ambiguity that nec-
essarily permeates Thomas.
The ambiguity associated with the Edwards rule involves Miranda. Mi-
randa provided clear-cut procedural protection against the potential for coerced
confessions by persons in police custody.75 There was speculation after Mi-
randa, however, that the Court was moving away from Miranda and its empha-
68. See, e.g., State v. Bauguss, 310 N.C. 259, 311 S.E.2d 248, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 136 (1984)
(quoting the Edwards rule but finding it inapplicable because defendant never invoked his right to
counsel); State v. Lang, 309 N.C. 512, 308 S.E.2d 317 (1983) (quoting the Edwards rule and deter-
mining that defendant initiated dialogue with the police but holding that there was prejudicial error
in the trial court's fact-finding effort to establish whether defendant made a "knowing, intelligent
and valid" waiver of his right); State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 304 S.E.2d 579 (1983) (quoting the
Edwards rule but finding it inapplicable because defendant never invoked his right to counsel).
69. See 2 H. BRamDIs, BRANDIS ON NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE, SECOND REVISED EDI-
TION OF STANSBuRY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 183 (1982).
70. See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); C. WoTE-
BREAD, supra note 4, § 15.02; 2 H. BRADIS, supra note 69, § 183.
71. See C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 4, § 15.04.
72. 2 H. BRANDIS, supra note 69, § 183.
73. State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 581, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983).
74. See, eg., State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C. 442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975); State v. Woodruff, 259 N.C.
333, 130 S.E.2d 641 (1963); State v. Livingston, 202 N.C. 809, 164 S.E. 337 (1932); State v. Whit-
field, 70 N.C. 356 (1874); State v. Roberts, 12 N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827).
75. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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sis on objective procedures. 76 Edwards, with its objective per se test, settled
speculation over whether the Court was in the process of abolishing Miranda.
77
A rule can be diminished without being abolished, however, and Edwards does
not preclude the possible diminution of Miranda.7S That Edwards itself is cir-
cumscribed by Innis and Bradshaw bears out this conclusion. Innis defined in-
terrogation as "words or actions . . . the police should know are reasonably
likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect" 79 and then applied
the term in a relatively conservative manner.80 Bradshaw determined that a
statement from a suspect that "could reasonably have been interpreted by the
officer as relating generally to the investigation" is sufficient to meet the Edwards
provision that there may be further interrogation even after a suspect has re-
quested an attorney if the suspect initiates dialogue with the police.81 Therefore,
although the basic rule of Edwards is per se, it is restrained by tests of reasona-
bleness. The questions inherent in a reasonableness approach are twofold: Has
the application of the reasonableness standard diminished Miranda's substantive
goal of protecting suspects in police custody from the threat of coerced confes-
sions, and does the reasonableness test's influence on Edwards diminish the Mi-
randa emphasis on objective procedural rules?82
These questions apply to the holding in Thomas. In Thomas, the North
Carolina Supreme Court, with minimal discussion, applied the Edwards rule and
the test for voluntariness to defendant's confession. The court quoted the Ed-
wards rule8 3 but then unequivocally stated that it was not violated because the
police officer's statement at issue was not interrogation. 84 The court based its
decision on the Innis definition of "interrogation," 85 concluding that it was not
true in this case that the officer "should have known that his 'off-hand' remark
was reasonably likely to provoke defendant into making an incriminating
statement."
'8 6
The North Carolina Supreme Court's conservative application of the Innis
definition is in accord with the United States Supreme Court's application of it
in Innis. Although Innis supported Miranda by specifying that interrogation
76. See C. WHrrEBREAD, supra note 4, § 15.08; Comment, Edwards v. Arizona: The Burger
Court Breathes New Life Into Miranda, 69 CALiF. L. R v. 1734, 1738-40 (1981).
77. Edwards has been called "the Burger Court's first clear-cut victory for Miranda." Sonen-
shein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 405, 447
(1982). No dissents were filed in Edwards.
78. See Comment, supra note 76, at 1748-51.
79. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01. See also supra text accompanying note 51 (setting forth the Innis
Court's interpretation of "interrogation").
80. See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
81. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1046.
82. See Fyfe, Enforcement Workshop: Oregon v. Bradshaw-What's Happening Here?, 20
CRIM. L. BULL. 154, 158-60 (1984); Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 446; Comment, supra note 60, at
527-30.
83. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 377, 312 S.E.2d at 462.
84. Id. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
85. The court actually cited a North Carolina case that stated the Innis definition, noting that
"[w]e have recognized that 'interrogation is not limited to express questioning by the police.'" Id. at
377, 312 S.E.2d at 463 (quoting State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 280, 302 S.E.2d 164, 170'(1983)).
86. Id. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
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under Miranda could include police activities other than questioning, 7 it also
refused to find that there was interrogation by the police officers during their
front seat conversation."8 The Innis holding-that police officers are not ex-
pected to know that a discussion about the danger of a school child finding a
missing gun might provoke an incriminating response from a defendant-was
reasonable. At least one commentator, however, has questioned whether this
application of the reasonableness test in Innis undermined Miranda by refusing
to classify police statements that directly resulted in defendant's incriminating
statements as interrogation.8 9 Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion in Innis,
described the majority's "reasonably likely to provoke".definition of interroga-
tion as consistent with Miranda but considered the Court's holding on the facts
of Innis contradictory to that definition.90
The North Carolina Supreme Court's holding in Thomas is subject to the
same criticisms as those aimed at Innis. The Supreme Court's holding in Innis,
however, did not require the result reached by the Thomas court. First, Innis
and Thomas are factually distinct. Innis involved a conversation between two
officers in which neither one spoke to the accused at all. 9 1 Thomas, on the other
hand, dealt with a remark made directly to the accused by an officer.92 Second,
Professor White has suggested that the Court's focus in Innis was on an objec-
tive standard rather than on the "actual intent" of the police. Professor White
has noted that the Court, in footnote seven of the majority opinion, "stated that
when 'a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response,' it is 'un-
likely' that the 'reasonably likely' test will not be met."'93 Professor White there-
fore has proposed:
In order to preserve both the majority's objective approach and a
close correlation between the officer's purpose and the "reasonably
likely" standard, the best reading of the Innis test is that it turns upon
the objective purpose manifested by the police. Thus, an officer
"should know" that his speech or conduct will be "reasonably likely to
elicit an incriminating response" when he should realize that the
speech or conduct will probably be viewed by the suspect as designed
to achieve this purpose. To ensure that the inquiry is entirely objec-
tive, the proposed test could be framed as follows: if an objective ob-
server (with the same knowledge of the suspect as the police officer)
would, on the sole basis of hearing the officer's remarks, infer that the
remarks were designed to elicit an incriminating response, then the re-
marks should constitute "interrogation." '94
Applying Professor White's interpretation of the Innis test to the officer's
87. See White, Interrogation Without Questions: Rhode Island v. Innis and United States v.
Henry, 78 MICH. L. REv. 1209, 1223 (1980).
88. See Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 446-47.
89. See id. at 446 (noting that Innis created a "potentially gaping hole in Miranda ").
90. Innis, 446 U.S. at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 294-95.
92. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 376, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
93. White, supra note 87, at 1231 (quoting Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n.7).
94. Id. at 1231-32 (emphasis omitted).
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remark in Thomas, it is possible to reach a different result than the court in
Thomas reached. An objective listener probably would infer that the officer told
defendant to tell his attorney about the opportunity defendant had been given to
help himself in an effort to elicit self-incrimination.
Because the North Carolina Supreme Court in Thomas construed the inter-
rogation definition so narrowly, Edwards' application in the North Carolina
courts is excessively constricted. If the courts continue to follow such a con-
servative interpretation of the Innis definition of interrogation, police may skill-
fully use manipulative techniques that do not rise to the level of what the North
Carolina Supreme Court has perceived as "interrogation" and thus circumvent
the Miranda goal of minimizing the coercive element of custodial interroga-
tion.95 These methods would not violate Edwards because technically they
would not be interrogation, but they would violate the spirit of Miranda by in-
ducing confessions that are the result of subtle compulsion.
96
It is worth considering, therefore, whether the North Carolina Supreme
Court followed the best line of interpretation of Edwards in Thomas. The
United States Supreme Court has indicated that although it might not expand
Miranda in the future, it will support it.97 Given the facts of Thomas, it would
be criticizing the North Carolina Supreme Court too harshly to say that the
court violated the meaning of Miranda in Thomas. Even if Professor White's
interpretation of the Innis rule is applied to Thomas, the fact situation in
Thomas is sufficiently ambiguous to allow support for the court's decision. The
real problem with Thomas is that it may encourage a much looser application of
both Miranda and Edwards in North Carolina courts.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Oregon v. Bradshaw leaves
open an issue which the Court may soon have to address-an issue of interest to
the North Carolina courts after Thomas. That issue concerns the relationship
between the threshold at which police comments and activity become interroga-
tion and the threshold at which a suspect's comments are considered to be initia-
tion of dialogue with the police. In Innis the officers' comments about the
95. This potential implication reflects Justice Marshall's complaint in his Bradshaw dissent con-
cerning the Court's broad interpretation of what is an initiation of dialogue by a defendant. (Justice
Marshall was joined in his dissent by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens.) He stated that
"[to allow the authorities to recommence an interrogation based on such a question is to permit
them to capitalize on the custodial setting. Yet Miranda's procedural protections were adopted
precisely in order 'to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings."' Bradshaw, 462
U.S. at 1056 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458).
96. See id. A similar fear has been voiced concerning the Bradshaw initiation rule:
By focusing on who initiates the dialogue, the Edwards-Bradshaw rule ignores certain
coercive aspects of the custodial environment. It would be possible for the police to manip-
ulate the initiation step to their own advantage by subjecting the suspect to more subtle
forms of coercion. For example, the police could ignore the suspect until concern about his
status, and the coerciveness of the custodial environment generally, induce him to initiate a
conversation with the police.
Comment, supra note 60, at 527-28.
97. The substance of the Edwards decision itself indicates this. It is interesting to note what
Chief Justice Burger said in his concurring opinion in Innis: "The meaning of Miranda has become
reasonably clear and law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would never over-
rule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." Innis, 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, J.,
concurring).
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missing gun directly preceded the defendant's self-incrimination; yet, those com-
ments were not considered interrogation by the Court.98 But in Bradshaw the
defendant's question as to what would happen to him next was considered to be
an initiation of the dialogue which resulted in a confession.9 9 The level of police
activity that is considered interrogation-and therefore a trigger of the Edwards
requirement that interrogation cease when defendant requests an attorney-is
much higher than that at which a defendant's comment or question is consid-
ered an initiation of dialogue and therefore sufficient to allow interrogation to
begin again. If that difference in thresholds is the rule, the ironic import of
Edwards is that, while the case purports to further Miranda's goal of protecting
a defendant in custody from self-incrimination, it actually diminishes Miranda.
The Court should consider setting thresholds at more comparable levels. 100
Thomas also raises questions concerning Miranda's procedural goals. One
of the primary goals of Miranda was to provide clear-cut rules of procedure to
help implement the constitutional protections. 10 1 Edwards has been greeted as
an effort by the Court to again provide a bright-line test.102 Because the North
Carolina Supreme Court in Thomas provides little analysis to support its conclu-
sion that the remark at issue in the case was not interrogation, 10 3 Thomas offers
little in the way of guidelines for the police to follow in attempting to obey the
dictates of Edwards. If the Edwards tests for interrogation and initiation are
dependent upon a case-by-case analysis, law enforcement officials are left in the
position of having to guess in advance what a court will and will not admit into
evidence.1° 4 Lack of procedural guidelines also impedes one of the stated pur-
poses for the Edwards rule: "to protect an accused in police custody from being
badgered by police officers in the manner in which the defendant in Edwards
was.' 05 If police are not fairly certain of what constitutes "badgering" and are
only able to find out by a process of "trial and error," the Edwards "prophylac-
tic rule" will not be consistently effective.106
Just as the problems inherent in the Edwards rule affect the decision in
Thomas, the ambiguity inherent in the North Carolina test for voluntariness in
confessions also affects the Thomas decision. A pure application of the Edwards
98. See id. at 294-95, 303.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 64-67.
100. See generally Fyfe, supra note 82, at 159-60 (concluding that "Bradshaw represents a seri-
ous erosion of Miranda and of the Edwards test").
101. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
102. See Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 447-51.
103. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 377-78, 312 S.E.2d at 463.
104. Justice Burger was troubled by this problem when he encountered it in theInnis definition.
According to the Chief Justice, "It may introduce new elements of uncertainty; under the Court's
test, a police officer, in the brief time available, apparently must evaluate the suggestibility and sus-
ceptibility of an accused." He noted that "[flew, if any, police officers are competent enough to have
the kind of evaluation seemingly contemplated." 446 U.S. at 304 (Burger, J., concurring).
105. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1044.
106. Professor Sonenshein has summed up the significance of guidelines in the Miranda area.
He concludes, "If there is a Miranda theme, it is that abuse of authority thrives on discretion. If
there is a legacy in Miranda, it is that the privilege against self-incrimination will only be honored in
the official interrogation setting when police and judges operate within clearly delineated guidelines."
Sonenshein, supra note 77, at 462.
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rule, after a finding that defendant initiated dialogue, would require the state to
prove that any confession resulting from the dialogue was made only after the
accused waived his rights. Such waiver must have been made knowingly and
intelligently in view of the totality of the circumstances. 10 7 The Edwards re-
quirement that there be a valid waiver, however, apparently is not considered to
be the equivalent of the voluntariness requirement in North Carolina.10 8 The
requirement that a defendant's confession be voluntary in order to be admissible
must be satisfied even when the rules of both Miranda and Edwards have been
met.10 9 North Carolina's voluntariness test grows out of a long history of case
law, much of which is still cited frequently by North Carolina courts. 110
While the supreme court in Thomas did not specifically discuss waiver, it
did discuss the voluntariness of defendant's confession. The court applied a to-
tality of the circumstances test to determine whether the confession in Thomas
was made voluntarily. 111 Applying the rule of State v. Corley,112 which indi-
cated that involuntariness is not caused by a single factor, the court noted that
no attempt was made to frighten or threaten defendant or otherwise coerce him
into making a statement.1 13 The court concluded that the officer's "off-hand"
statement was not a sufficient basis for considering defendant's confession invol-
untary1 14 and admitted the confession into evidence.'
15
The court's "totality of the circumstances" test for voluntariness is some-
what puzzling in light of traditional North Carolina confession law. North Car-
olina cases repeatedly state that a confession produced by a promise of leniency
or by a threat-a confession that is the result of hope or fear induced by the
police in a defendant-is not a voluntary confession. 116 In Corley the court ada-
mantly stated that this standard was not a per se rule,11 7 finding instead that the
totality of the circumstances had to indicate the confession was involuntary.
107. See supra note 60.
108. The North Carolina Supreme Court has stated that "in determining whether a defendant's
confession was voluntarily and intelligently made... '[t]he North Carolina rule and the federal rule
for determining the admissibility of a confession is [sic] the same.'" State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40,
48, 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (quoting State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 581, 304 S.E.2d 134, 152 (1983)).
The court went on to add, however, that "this principle controls 'without regard to whether the
claim of inadmissibility rests upon constitutional grounds or rests solely upon our rule of evidence
requiring the exclusion of involuntary confessions.'" Id. at 48, 311 S.E.2d at 545 (quoting State v.
Branch, 306 N.C. 101, 108, 291 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982)) (emphasis added).
Within the Miranda context itself, a voluntary confession is not prohibited. The Supreme Court
said in Miranda that "[a]ny statement given freely and voluntarily without any compelling influence
is, of course, admissible in evidence." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478.
109. See State v. Corley, 310 N.C. 40, 47, 311 S.E.2d 540, 545 (1984).
110. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 308 N.C. 549, 304 S.E.2d 134 (1983); State v. Pruitt, 286 N.C.
442, 212 S.E.2d 92 (1975); State v. Bishop, 272 N.C. 283, 158 S.E.2d 511 (1968); State v. Roberts, 12
N.C. (1 Dev.) 259 (1827).
111. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 378-79, 312 S.E.2d at 463-64.
112. 310 N.C. 40, 47, 311 S.E.2d 540, 547 (1984).
113. Thomas, 310 N.C. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
117. 310 N.C. at 48, 311 S.E.2d at 544.
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The court in Corley implied that it did not overrule prior law. 118
The juxtaposition of Corley and the existing case law creates confusion re-
garding the voluntariness test. That Thomas restated the totality of circum-
stances test, while applying it in a situation in which defendant's confession
could well have been a product of hope or fear, increases the existing uncertainty
surrounding the voluntariness rule.
In a dissent to Corley, Justice Exum expressed concern over the ambiguity
in the application of the voluntariness standard, stating that the totality of the
circumstances rule previously had been used to determine voluntariness only
"[i]n the absence of a promise or threat." 119 In his dissent in Thomas, Exum
stated, "When a confession follows a promise of leniency, the confession is inad-
missible unless it can be shown that the influence of the promise had been en-
tirely dissipated so that the promise did not in fact induce the confession."
' 1 20
He then explained that "[w]here there is evidence in the case that the influence
of a promise of leniency has been dissipated, or 'entirely done away with,' before
the confession was made, then the question of whether the confession was a
product of the promise is resolved by considering the 'totality of circum-
stances.' "121 According to Exum, "[tihere is nothing in the record to indicate
that [defendant's confession] could have been the product of anything" other
than the officer's statement.122
The most troublesome aspect of the voluntariness issue in Thomas is not
whether the majority was justified in dismissing the comment as an "off-hand
statement of an officer, which is at best ambiguous," 123 but rather is the same
problem of uncertainty present in the court's decision concerning defendant's
Edwards claim. If the application of a totality of circumstances test requires a
case-by-case analysis of every confession the voluntariness of which is at issue,
the result is a situation in which police have few guidelines. 124 The same
problems, confusions, and abuses that exist in the Miranda context when its
guidelines are blurred are present in the totality of circumstances interpretation
of the voluntariness standard. 125 Justice Exum's perspective, which incorpo-
rates North Carolina's historical test for voluntariness, provides a great deal
more objectivity and certainty for the law of confessions than does the majority's
approach in Thomas.
The court's decision in Thomas made no definite changes in the law gov-
118. See id.
119. Id. at 56-58, 311 S.E.2d at 550 (Exum, J., dissenting).
120. 310 N.C. at 382, 312 S.E.2d at 465 (Exum, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 382, 312 S.E.2d at 466 (Exum, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 382, 312 S.E.2d at 465 (Exum, ., dissenting).
123. Id. at 379, 312 S.E.2d at 464.
124. One commentator discussing the Bradshaw decision expressed concern over what he re-
ferred to as "attempts to individualize justice." He noted that these efforts may please arresting
officers, but they also "seriously damage the quality of justice in the great majority of cases." Fur-
thermore, he stated that "[flew of us enjoy seeing the factually guilty escape conviction, but the
reality is that rules and principles that enhance justice in the general run of cases are certain to
enhance opportunities for injustice in some specific cases." Fyfe, supra note 82, at 154.
125. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
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erning the admission of confessions into evidence and was not overtly inconsis-
tent with United States Supreme Court decisions concerning confessions. The
decision, however, might have undercut Miranda and Edwards unnecessarily
and in so doing might have set a hazardous precedent for North Carolina courts
to follow. Thomas also might have hastened a course of uncertainty in the appli-
cation of North Carolina's voluntariness standard. Both results of the case
might mean future abuse as both courts and law enforcement officials attempt to
function with diminishing or minimal guidelines.
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